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The Dutch, Munsees, and the 
Purchase of Manhattan Island 
by Paul Otto
from Opening Statements – Law, Jurisprudence, 
and the History of Dutch New York
Albert M. Rosenblatt and Julia C. Rosenblatt, Eds.
From the Introduction to Opening Statements
We may call England our “mother country,” but our 
culture, political system, and jurisprudence have a more 
varied heritage. Each state with its own settlement his-
tory has a unique flavor. Our nation’s lineage, and New 
York’s in particular, has an often-overlooked Dutch 
component. Scholars differ as to how much of New 
Netherland, or Dutch New York, survived in present-
day institutions. Some commentators say that the het-
erogeneous, commerce-oriented nature of the 40 years 
or so of Dutch settlement gave New York a character 
that persists to this day. Others contend that little, if 
anything, survives.
By the beginning of the 17th century, Western Europe 
had a long-established trade relationship with the East, 
from which it desired luxuries such as spices and pre-
cious stones. In exchange, the East valued European 
goods, silver, and manufactured articles.
Europeans had few trade routes. One was across the 
desert and mountains to the Caspian and Black Seas; 
another from the Arabian and Red Seas into the Indian 
Ocean; still another around the Cape of Good Hope. 
Because these routes were long and controlled by rival 
countries, each sought alternate passageways to the East, 
including a “Northeast passage” to Asia.
The Netherlands, at the time a center of trade and 
commerce, hoped to find such a route. In 1609, the Dutch 
East India Company engaged Henry Hudson, an English-
man, for the venture. He did not find the route and is best 
known for exploring the river that now bears his name.
Not long after Hudson’s exploration, the Dutch sent 
others to examine the territory. Adriaen Block explored 
the coast all the way to Cape Cod and mapped the region. 
When in 1613 his ship burned near the shore of lower 
Manhattan, he and his crew built a new one on the spot.
Although the Dutch never found the hoped-for 
“Northeast passage,” they found a land teeming with 
resources to trade, especially a wealth of beavers, whose 
pelts found favor in European fashion. From 1624 through 
1664, the Dutch colonized and controlled a large area 
– ”New Netherland,” including “New Amsterdam” as its
nerve center. For that near half-century, the Dutch estab-
lished government, trade, and institutions that helped 
shape the future of what would become New York.
For years, the history of New York under Dutch rule 
languished in what Washington Irving called “the regions 
of doubt and fable.” He used this phrase in his preface, 
“an author’s apology,” to the 1848 edition of his whimsi-
cal history of New York as told by an imaginary Diedrich 
Knickerbocker.
Irving penned his fictional history in 1809, the bicen-
tennial year of Hudson’s exploration of the river so vital 
to New Netherland. Irving never intended his writing to 
substitute for true historical scholarship, merely using the 
gap in recorded history to write something entertaining. 
Indeed, he was one of the citizens who banded together 
in 1804 to form the New-York Historical Society, which 
took steps to acquire and preserve New York’s historical 
record. Ironically, his “history” plunged the Dutch epoch 
even deeper into the shadowy realm of legend.
The Dutch period would have remained in Washing-
ton Irving’s land of doubt and fable were it not for people 
who had a passion to preserve and study documents 
from the era. Many records, letters, diaries, and the like 
have perished through neglect or disaster. Others have 
been spared. The saga of the archives is an adventure 
story in itself.
. . .
Much of the contemporary writing about New Nether-
land shows the place to be rife with drunkenness, brawl-
ing, and adultery – truly disorderly. Disorder endows 
writing with the dramatic tension that makes exciting 
reading, and many primary sources lead directly to 
this aspect of life. A significant part of New Netherland 
documents comes from court records, which by their very 
nature chronicle crime and conflict.
. . .
The recent quadricentennial of Henry Hudson’s 1609 
exploration has brought renewed interest in the period 
and new scholarly accounts. The recent flurry of interest 
comes from more than the current century marker. Sev-
eral events have brought the study of this period to light: 
official land deed (nor does one exist). Despite all these 
imperfections, and in the absence of a true deed, New 
Yorkers must satisfy themselves with this document, 
which they have done since it was first uncovered in 
1844. But even if a deed did exist, New Yorkers would 
still be left with some important questions. First, deed or 
no deed, confusion surrounds the amount paid for Man-
hattan Island. The Schagen letter records the figure of 60 
guilders while American tradition holds that it was $24. 
Second, it is not clear why Native Americans would sell 
or transfer the island for this or any amount of money. 
Third, and most important, what did the Indians mean 
by “selling” the land? 
. . .
In the heart of the territory where New York City 
and portions of New York and New Jersey would some-
day be located, lived the Munsee people. These Native 
Americans had lived in the region for at least hundreds 
of years. They have also been known as Lenapes and 
Delawares. No term adequately describes the group, in 
part because it is not fully accurate to describe them as 
a single Indian tribe. Instead, the Munsees represented 
a collection of villages, clans, and larger groupings 
sharing a common language and cultural practices. The 
Munsees were also linguistically linked to their south-
ern and western neighbors, the Unami, who have also 
been known as the Delawares or Lenni Lenape. In the 
17th century, these people would find themselves the 
“hosts” of wave after wave of European “guests.” In the 
earliest years, native people may have welcomed these 
visitors and the advantages a relationship with them 
brought in trade, but eventually they found control of 
their territory challenged and their sovereignty in the 
land threatened.
Dutch colonization of New Netherland did not begin 
with settlement or land acquisitions. It began, rather, with 
a series of trading voyages to the Hudson River valley 
and elsewhere along the Atlantic coast. By 1611, Dutch 
captains plied American waters seeking to exchange 
European wares for North American furs. The Munsees 
mostly welcomed these voyages and for more than 10 
years a thriving fur trade existed in lands occupied by 
Munsee Indians and labeled on Dutch maps as “Nieu 
Nederlandt.” Most of these trade expeditions consisted of 
ships traveling the marine and riparian coasts and mak-
ing exchanges where they could. Certain locales became 
particularly important, such as the region where Albany 
now stands. There, in 1614, Dutch traders established an 
outpost, Fort Nassau, which was abandoned after 1616. 
But for the most part, in this era of trade, the Indians 
remained the masters of their lands. Dutch traders did 
not establish long-term outposts and apparently did not 
purchase land from the Indians. Certainly no settlers 
came to live there. As far as the scarce records indicate, 
this situation was mutually acceptable and beneficial to 
European and Indian alike. The Indians of the Hudson 
First, scholars have access to more primary source mate-
rial than ever before, owing to the work of the New Neth-
erland Project under the direction of Charles Gehring. 
Second, the best-selling The Island at the Center of the World 
by Russell Shorto has brought this facet of our history to 
public attention. Examining Dutch influence on America 
is too interesting to be a once-a-century phenomenon. 
Many avenues of research lie before future scholars. Let 
us hope they maintain a steady stream of new informa-
tion and further illumination from historians. 
In the present volume, a broad spectrum of emi-
nent scholars treat the legal heritage New Netherland 
bequeathed to New York. This volume covers a number 
of issues that speak to that heritage, including concepts 
of governance, liberty, women’s rights, and religious 
freedom. In many ways, those fundamental concepts 
resonate in today’s legal culture. Not all our authors 
agree with each other about everything, and that is fine. 
Controversy advances scholarship.
Real Estate or Political Sovereignty? The Dutch, 
Munsees, and the Purchase of Manhattan Island
By Paul Otto
One legacy of New Netherland is legend. A particularly persis-
tent story is of Peter Minuit’s “purchase” of Manhattan from 
the Native Americans for $24. In the essay that follows, Paul 
Otto describes relationships between the Dutch and Native 
Americans and debunks some of the popular myths about how 
the Dutch acquired Manhattan.
A.R. & J.R, eds.
In 1626, Pieter Schagen, representative of the States 
General in the West India Company, wrote of the arrival 
in the fatherland of a ship, the Arms of Amsterdam, 
from New Netherland. He reported news from the colo-
ny and listed the goods arriving in the Dutch Republic. 
He also nonchalantly reported that the Dutch in New 
Netherland “have purchased the Island Manhattes from 
the Indians for the value of 60 guilders; ‘tis 11,000 mor-
gens in size.” A seemingly innocuous statement of fact 
about a land transfer between Native Americans and the 
Dutch, the statement is nonetheless of profound signifi-
cance. For New Yorkers, this letter, the primary docu-
mentation of the transfer of Manhattan Island to the 
hands of Europeans, serves as a kind of birth certificate 
for New York City.
This is the closest thing we have to a formal notice 
of this purchase, but it provides little of the information 
we might hope for from official documents, leaving us 
many questions. As a birth certificate, the document fails 
to provide an exact date of the “birth,” and it does not 
identify where the event took place. As documentation 
for the most infamous land transfer in American history, 
it also falls short of the mark. Besides not identifying the 
place and date of this historic transfer, it does not item-
ize the goods in the exchange or the exact identity of the 
parties to the exchange. More importantly, it is not an 
live among us, a contract being made thereof and signed 
by them in their manner, since such contracts upon other 
occasions may be very useful to the Company.” Thus, the 
Company was willing to accommodate Indian claims to 
the land, but not, in the final analysis, to bow to those 
claims. In later instructions, Verhulst was ordered to find 
a place to establish the Company headquarters that was 
“abandoned by the Indians or unoccupied,” and if he 
could obtain “none but those that are occupied by the 
Indians, they shall see whether they cannot, either in 
return for trading-goods or by means of some amicable 
agreement, induce them to give up ownership and pos-
session to us.” Thus, the acquisition of some Indian land 
would have to be accomplished, but the means would 
be dictated by concerns of fairness and justice: “without 
however forcing them thereto in the least or taking pos-
session by craft or fraud.”
Verhulst did not accomplish this task of purchasing 
a site for the administrative headquarters of the colony, 
but in the spring of 1626, his successor, Director Peter 
Minuit purchased Manhattan Island. In addition to Pieter 
Schagen’s reference to the purchase cited at the beginning 
of this chapter, other records also refer to it. West India 
Company director Johannes de Laet wrote in 1630 that 
there was an island at the mouth of the Hudson called 
“Manhattes or Manhatans Island, because this nation of 
Indians happened to possess the same, and by them it 
had been sold to the Company.” In 1633 he also stated 
that “our people have bought from [the Manathans] the 
island separated from the rest of the land by the Hellgate, 
and have there laid the foundations of a fort, and of a 
town called New Amsterdam.”
Tradition holds that the island was purchased with 
“glittering beads and baubles,” but the actual nature and 
content of the goods traded to the Indians for the island 
is unknown. It can be surmised that the Indians accepted 
the typical trade items. When the Dutch purchased Staten 
Island a few years later, they paid the Indians with “Duf-
fels, Kittles, Axes, Hoes, Wampum, Drilling Awls, Jews 
harps, and diverse other small wares.” The value of the 
goods – 60 guilders – is documented, but here, too, tradi-
tion is misleading. Most Americans who have heard the 
price paid for Manhattan Island cite the figure of $24. 
This figure appeared in 1846 when E. B. O’Callaghan, 
who had access to the recently discovered Schagen let-
ter, published his History of New Netherland. It was there 
that O’Callaghan introduced the figure of $24 by using 
River valley happily exchanged the products of the forest 
for goods that they found both exotic and useful.
After 1621, this situation began to change. In the 
Dutch Republic, the West India Company was cre-
ated and given a monopoly of Dutch commercial activ-
ity throughout the Atlantic world. While the West India 
Company’s earliest activities in New Netherland cen-
tered mostly upon trade, the WIC had considered the 
possibility of settlement almost from the beginning and 
soon took more concrete steps in that direction. France 
and England began to challenge the Dutch Republic’s 
claims in the New World based primarily on the right of 
first discovery. With the States General adding pressure 
to the West India Company to respond to this crisis, the 
Company decided to establish a permanent settlement 
in New Netherland. The availability of several Walloon 
families (Francophones from the southern Netherlands) 
willing to immigrate to New Netherland helped finalize 
their decision.
The result was the establishment of a settlement 
colony in New Netherland. Thus, with the creation of the 
West India Company and the choice to establish Euro-
pean settlers in their North American territory, came a 
significantly different focus in Dutch attitudes toward a 
region that was also claimed, inhabited, and controlled 
by the Munsees. The West India Company was still com-
mitted to an emphasis on the fur trade and no plans were 
initially laid for large-scale settlement as was happening 
in Virginia and would later occur in Massachusetts Bay. 
But the presence of the Company nevertheless affected 
Dutch-Indian affairs in a number of ways. Because the 
West India Company needed to secure a solid legal claim 
to the territory and defend it against European competi-
tors, it purchased land from the Indians and established 
settlements there. Furthermore, land exchanges signified 
presumed Dutch sovereignty over the region and its 
inhabitants.
In 1625, the Company instructed Director Willem 
Verhulst to acquire land from the Indians on which to 
establish a headquarters for the colony. Their instructions 
demonstrate the Company’s approach to the native peo-
ple – apparently respecting their indigenous rights on the 
one hand, but also to some degree presuming Dutch sov-
ereignty over the region. In acquiring their land, the Indi-
ans were not to “be driven away by force or threats, but 
by good words be persuaded to leave, or be given some-
thing therefor to their satisfaction, or else be allowed to 
tant in native demand for certain products. Axes and 
hoes, for example, quickly became employed by Indians 
in place of native stone tools even though one oral tra-
dition repeated by the Indians in the 18th century indi-
cates that their forebears first wore axeheads received 
from Europeans around their necks as tokens of power. 
For wampum producers, Indians who crafted the shell 
of the coastal whelk into strings of beads with signifi-
cant social and religious power, the iron drills and awls 
they received greatly enhanced their manufacture of 
this vital artifact. Duffels – a coarse cloth – had become 
an important item of trade in the 1620s. The Munsees 
began to substitute duffels for deerskins, using it for 
clothing during the day and for blankets at night. The 
native people preferred it in dark colors such as blue, 
grey, and black, possibly because they believed these 
would provide them better camouflage while hunting 
in the woods, but also likely because they attached 
dark colors to sources of power. Demand for duffels 
also indicates the Indians’ growing dependency upon 
European goods. As the Munsees increased the time 
they spent harvesting furs or producing wampum, they 
would have less time to produce basic necessities such 
as clothing, forcing them to acquire these items from the 
Dutch. [Colonial secretary Isaac] de Rasière made clear 
the importance of duffels to the Indians when he sug-
gested to the Company directors that if they could “sup-
ply me continually with duffels, I shall know how to get 
wampum and stock Fort Orange.” de Rasière promised 
the directors 10,000 furs if they could provide him with 
sufficient duffels. The Munsees’ northern neighbors, the 
Mohawks, prized it so highly that they announced they 
should not bother trading with the Dutch if they could 
not get it. It was so crucial, De Rasiere pointed out, that 
without it they might lose the trade. “Why should we 
go hunting?” the Mohawks asked. “Half the time you 
have no cloth.” Thus, the goods offered by the Dutch 
for Manhattan Island satisfied important Munsee needs.
The transfer of Manhattan Island and other territories 
from the Munsees to the Dutch signified a great deal 
about the relationship between them. In the first place, 
they followed a formal protocol when conducting land 
transactions. Company regulations required Dutch offi-
cials to preside over agreements between Europeans and 
Indians and to create legal deeds. As historian Patricia 
Seed has shown, this reflected a long-standing Dutch 
tradition in which property conveyances took place 
before a district judge. Consequently, the native repre-
sentatives were obligated to appear before the council at 
Fort Amsterdam for land sales. When circumstances pre-
vented them from doing so, such as when the Unamis on 
Delaware Bay sold land, officials from the fort journeyed 
to the Indians’ territory. The Indians were more than 
happy to oblige such formalities, since they too regarded 
these exchanges as significant affairs. Those who sold the 
land were usually tribal or village leaders or some other 
current rates of conversion. Since that time, the story of 
Manhattan Island being sold for $24 in trade goods has 
been retold and republished many, many times, leaving 
the original Dutch amount of 60 guilders lost in transla-
tion, as it were.
But the value of the guilder or dollar in the 19th cen-
tury tells us little about the actual price the Dutch paid in 
1626. Even to calculate the value in dollars today, given 
inflation, of 60 17th-century guilders misses the point. 
Sixty guilders was not a large sum at the time, but nei-
ther was it minuscule. According to historian A. Th. van 
Deursen, it equaled three or four months’ wages for an 
average artisan in the province of Holland. . . . Sixty guil-
ders was also the amount the Company paid a colonist 
(and presumably an Indian as well) for 30 beaver skins or 
12 fathoms of wampum.
To the Dutch, the land was certainly valuable at the 
time (it would be anachronistic to consider its value today 
as the commercial capital of the world). The 14,000 acre 
island became the Company’s headquarters and the loca-
tion of the Company’s farms and agricultural endeavors. 
Domine Michaëlius reported that “this island is the key 
and principal stronghold of the country, and needs to be 
settled first, as is already done.” In fact, since controlling 
Manhattan Island meant controlling the Hudson River, 
which reached deep into fur country, the island’s value 
can be understood in terms of the value of the fur trade. 
It is perhaps not without coincidence that Schagen’s letter 
reporting the purchase of Manhattan Island also reports 
the importation of 45,000 guilders worth of furs from 
New Netherland. It is possible that the Dutch attraction 
to Manhattan Island was also connected to the trade 
in wampum. The Dutch had early on discovered that 
wampum, or sewant as it was known among the Indians 
of Manhattan and vicinity, was highly valued by the lro-
quoians and other inland tribes. These peoples exchanged 
various goods to coastal wampum makers for the beads. 
Although the heart of wampum production lay in eastern 
Long Island, it was manufactured throughout New York’s 
coastal regions. Whatever the case may have been regard-
ing wampum, the Dutch certainly recognized at the time 
that they had purchased the Indians’ land for a very low 
price, for Domine Michaëlius also noted, presumably refer-
ring to the purchase of Manhattan Island, that “for a small 
sum of money we can buy from them a large quantity of 
land,” and elsewhere noted that there is land “which can 
be bought from the savages for a trifle.”
From the Indians’ perspective, 60 guilders of trade 
goods was of enormous value to them. At the first, the 
Munsees may have valued European goods because 
they assigned spiritual or ceremonial power to items 
handled by those they animistically perceived as “other-
than-human.” But within a relatively short amount of 
time, this perception would have passed. While the 
exchange of goods still functioned in a socially cohesive 
way, the utilitarian function of the goods became impor-
ing, fishing, agriculture, and habitation. When Indian 
leaders signed agreements “selling” their land, they were 
allowing for its joint use and occupancy by the Dutch 
and their own people. They did not envision a permanent 
transfer of land to the Dutch. For example, when Indians 
of Long Island sold a sizable portion of the island in 1639, 
they reserved the right to remain upon the land. While 
other deeds did not always specify such rights, it is clear 
from Munsee actions that they must have had similar 
intentions at other times. The Indians who sold Manhat-
tan Island continued to live there, indicating that they 
assumed that they still retained possession of the land, 
not to mention sovereignty over it. Similarly, Munsee 
people also remained on Staten Island after selling it, and 
over the years, resold it several times.
Furthermore, land transfers in the Munsees’ per-
spective must be understood in terms of the Indians’ 
emphasis upon social cohesion. In the perspective of 
the Munsees, as with so many other native people of 
the northeastern woodlands, maintaining social balance 
was of utmost importance. Establishing and continu-
ing relationships held a greater priority than amassing 
wealth, but such relationship building usually included 
the exchange of goods. Colonial secretary de Rasière 
understood that the Indians always embellished trade 
with considerable ceremony and was careful to maintain 
it. “These people must . . . be kept on friendly terms by 
kindness and occasional small gifts,” he wrote, and “one 
must be familiar with them and allow them to think that 
one trusts them fully.” When a delegation of “thirty or 
forty” Indians presented de Rasière “with ten beavers,” 
he responded by giving them “in return a fathom of 
duffel-cloth and a small quantity of beads, two hatch-
ets, and a few other things.” De Rasière noted that this 
“was done reciprocally in token of sworn friendship.” 
Transferring land, including the exchange of goods and 
attendant ceremonies, was a means to build and rein-
force social relations. The Munsees saw the Dutch as 
more than just trading partners – they were allies and 
powerful neighbors with whom it was good to establish 
and maintain strong ties.
Moreover, land transfers served other purposes to 
the Munsees and did not reflect the natives’ inten-
tions to permanently alienate the land from themselves. 
As the Indians’ population declined and their subsis-
tence shifted from wide-ranging hunting to more inten-
sive farming and wampum production, large hunting 
areas became less valuable. In the sachems’ minds, the 
exchange of land for trade goods seemed reasonable. 
Such an exchange would also secure an alliance with the 
Dutch who would live among them and could help the 
Munsees defend themselves against their enemies. In 
fact, the same Indians on Long Island who reserved the 
right of occupancy in their deed of land in 1639, gained 
from the Dutch an agreement to protect them against 
their enemies. This pattern was not unusual for the 
group representatives. For example, on July 12, 1630, 
Arromeauw, Tekwappo, and Sackwomeck, “co-owners 
of the land named Hobocanhackingh,” according to one 
Dutch deed, appeared before the director and his coun-
cil when they sold a tract of land to Michael Pauw. The 
next month, Waerhinnis Couwee (Wieromies), a minor 
Hackensack sachem, along with Krahorat, Tamekap, 
Tetemakwemama, Siearewach, Sackwewew, Wissipoock, 
and Saheinsios also presented themselves to [Director 
Wouter] van Twiller and his council in order to seal 
the transfer of Staten Island to Michael Pauw. Similar 
transactions between Munsee leaders and Dutch officials 
occurred through the remainder of this period.
Such formality in conducting land sales indicated 
that neither group saw the transaction as the ordinary 
exchange of land from one person or group of persons to 
another. Dutchmen could not simply move to New Neth-
erland and purchase a tract of land from its indigenous 
owners. This was due, on the Dutch side, to West India 
Company recognition of Indian occupation of the land 
(remember Company dictates not to force “them thereto 
in the least or [take] possession by craft or fraud”), and 
the Dutch penchant for documenting such transactions. 
They insisted that colonial officials negotiate formal trea-
ties ceding property rights to the Dutch. Therefore, indi-
vidual Dutchmen could not purchase land directly from 
the Indians. The initial transfer of land was restricted to 
negotiated treaties between the West India Company and 
Indian representatives.
Munsees who signed documents ceding territory to 
the Dutch also viewed the transactions as carrying con-
siderable consequence. Like Dutch officials, Indian lead-
ers represented their people; any changes regarding their 
people’s land had to be endorsed by them. However, the 
Indians’ view of land ownership or sovereignty differed 
radically from that of the Dutch, and they initially under-
stood these land transactions differently than did the 
Europeans. First, the Munsees did not recognize personal 
ownership of any particular tract of land. As a group, 
their band or village used different territories for hunt-
Walloons in 1624 to “take especial care, whether in trad-
ing or in other matters, faithfully to fulfill their promises 
to the Indians or other neighbors and not to give them 
any offense without cause as regards their persons, wives, 
or property, on pain of being rigorously punished there-
for.” The following year, Director Verhulst was similarly 
instructed to “see that no one do the Indians any harm or 
violence, deceive, mock, or contemn them in any way, but 
that in addition to good treatment they be shown honesty, 
faithfulness, and sincerity in all contracts, dealings, and 
intercourse, without being deceived by shortage of mea-
sure, weight, or number, and that throughout friendly 
relations with them be maintained.”
A second set of instructions to Verhulst a few months 
later provides a better indication of the relationship which 
the directors believed should exist between their colony 
and the Indians who lived within its boundaries. While 
on the one hand expecting justice accorded to their own 
people, the Company apparently respected tribal author-
ity. In case any settler “suffer violence or be wronged by 
any Indian or native either in his person or with regard 
to the property entrusted to him, they shall notify the 
tribe to whom such Indian belongs of the wrong done 
and the person who committed it, demanding that he 
be punished therefor and that our people be notified of 
the punishment.” Ultimately, though, the Dutch reserved 
final political authority for themselves. 
. . .
In selling Manhattan Island and other properties, the 
Munsees did not intend to permanently transfer their 
land to the Dutch. Instead, they granted the Dutch the 
privilege of sharing the land with them. The Munsees 
could not foresee the future, however. What they did not 
anticipate was that the Dutch presence corresponded 
to a conflict of claims over control of the whole region. 
From the moment that the West India Company estab-
lished Europeans settlements and sought to purchase 
land from the Indians, the Munsee people would strug-
gle to maintain their own autonomy while increasingly 
being forced to recognize Dutch control. Ultimately, the 
importance of the selling of Manhattan had more to do 
with the Indians’ loss of sovereignty in the long run than 
their loss of land in the short run. Neither was intended 
by the Munsee people. However, after decades of con-
tact with Europeans, the Munsees experienced growing 
dependency upon European goods and suffered increas-
ing population losses through disease and warfare. 
The effects wrought upon Munsee society as a result 
of Dutch colonization made the temporary transfer of 
Manhattan Island and other Munsee lands a permanent 
one. The Munsees could not have foreseen the perma-
nent loss of their lands to the Dutch. And if the Dutch 
could have imagined the eventual loss of that same land 
to the English, none of them could have anticipated that 
Manhattan Island would become the metropolis that 
emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
Munsees or other Indian groups. As populations would 
increase or decrease for whatever reasons, native people 
would expand or contract their settlements and tempo-
rarily transfer unused land in the process. As population 
shifts again took place, land might be transferred back 
to the original occupants. In no case were the transfers 
considered permanent since Indian neighbors tended to 
recognize that possession or occupation of a territory was 
dependent upon the good graces of the group who had 
earlier established sovereignty over the land. Also, with 
economic changes brought by the presence of the Dutch, 
the Munsees’ growing dependency upon the Dutch may 
have compelled them to sell their lands, especially if they 
believed that doing so would ensure them continued 
access to European goods.
But the exchange of land led to unpredictable changes 
in Native American relations with the Dutch. While the 
Munsees did not knowingly relinquish their permanent 
rights to the land when they sold it, they soon discovered 
that they had surrendered permanent control over the 
territory, along with their political sovereignty. Indeed, 
Dutch colonization brought some presumption that the 
Dutch were extending their sovereignty over all the lands 
claimed under the name of “New Netherland.” The Com-
pany regulations for the colony that most clearly related to 
the Indians were ambiguous at times and did not clearly 
define the relationship of the Indians to the colony. On 
the whole, however, the regulations indicate that the 
West India Company claimed some political sovereignty 
over the indigenous inhabitants of the region, but also 
respected some degree of native autonomy for the sake of 
maintaining a successful trade relationship. These instruc-
tions included guidelines for Dutch interaction with their 
native hosts and required both settlers and colonial admin-
istrators to treat the Indians fairly and maintain peaceful 
interaction. The Amsterdam chamber commanded the 
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